The savings rate of the above residents. After the implementation of the new rural insurance, residents under the age of 60 are in the stage of participating in the payment of insurance, but since the majority of the residents' new rural insurance contributions are only 1 yuan, they are expected to generate less pension benefits in the future, so it is difficult to pass wealth. Alternative effects and channels to reduce income risk reduce household savings. However, residents over the age of 60 are more directly affected by the new rural insurance. They can receive pensions directly without paying the fees. The absolute amount of the annual pension they receive is not large (about 660 yuan), but it accounts for the income. The average share has reached 22.4%, and the immediate realization of pension wealth can effectively reduce the current income risk.
The structure of the following sections is as follows: The second part reviews the impact of pension insurance on household savings, and introduces the institutional background of the implementation of new rural insurance; the third part introduces the data used in this paper and describes the main variables; Discuss the regression results of the participation of residents under 60 years old in the impact of new rural insurance contributions on savings; the fifth part discusses the regression results of the impact of new farmers' pensions on savings for residents over 60 years old; the sixth part summarizes the full text.
Second, review and background The theory of the impact of pension insurance on household savings can be traced back to the life cycle theory proposed by Modigliani (1970). This is the consumption after the break. Based on this theory, FeldStein (1974) proposed that pension insurance has a “wealth substitution effect†on savings. The pensions that can be expected in the future after paying pension insurance premiums (ie pension funds) will reduce current personal savings. . In other words, pension insurance contributions, as a form of forced savings, will squeeze out other current voluntary savings.
However, if people save for other purposes when they are young, and not just for the elderly, the role of pensions in saving out will be reduced. For example, SarmviCk (1998) pointed out that in order to cope with large-scale expenditure risks (such as housing or major medical care), people have a target saving motive, that is, residents have a target value of savings, so pension insurance does not reduce residents' voluntary savings. Other studies have pointed out that if households have liquidity constraints, the role of pension insurance in reducing savings will be greatly reduced (Hubbard, in addition to reducing household savings through the “wealth substitution effectâ€, pension insurance can also reduce people's future (especially retirement). Post-income risk of income, thereby reducing preventive savings (Hubbardudd, 1987). Preventive savings is a saving motive generated by households in response to future income or expenditure risks. According to research by Yi Xingjian et al. (2008), Chinese families Has a strong preventive saving motivation.
Since the 1970s, a large number of studies have examined the impact of pension insurance on household consumption and savings. Feld Stein (1974) used time series data to verify the alternative relationship between US household pension wealth and household savings, but the use of time series data could not rule out the effects of other factors at the same time. Since then, many studies have begun to use micro household data to examine the impact of pensions on household savings. Studies by Dicks-MireauxKing (1982), DiamondHausman (1984), and Gale (1998) have found that pensions have a significant negative effect on household savings. However, other studies have not found that pensions are stored, but these studies use cross-sectional data, which do not solve the endogenous problem of pensions. Individuals participate in pension insurance itself, there are self-selection, and some unobservable factors affect pensions at the same time. The amount and savings rate will therefore lead to bias in the estimates. In the 21st century, many studies have begun to overcome the endogenous problems of pension insurance by using natural experiments and instrumental variables. Attanasio Brugiavini (2003) and Attanasio Rohwedder (2003) studied the effects of exogenous changes in Italian and British pension wealth on household savings rates, respectively, and found that pension wealth has a significant negative effect on household savings. Engelhardt (19) also suggested that self-binding savings, short-sightedness, and lack of financial knowledge (financialliteracy) may also lead to the inability of pension insurance to reduce household savings.
Hubbard (1986) even found that for families with liquidity constraints, an increase in pension wealth would increase household savings.
(2013) Using data from the United States and Europe, respectively, to construct tool variables for pension wealth by using exogenous policy rules, and also found that pension wealth significantly squeezed out private savings. The study is the study of the influence the amount of pension wealth change has been on saving the insured population, but can not examine the impact of the new pension system brought about by the establishment.
Before the new rural insurance, China's endowment insurance is mainly the basic endowment insurance for urban workers. At present, research on the impact of endowment insurance on household savings based on Chinese data is concentrated here. He Lixin et al. (2010) and Fengetal. (2011) examined the impact of China's urban employee pension insurance reform in 1997. They found that the reduction in net wealth of pensions brought about by this reform significantly increased household savings.
Bai Chongen et al. (2012) used urban household data from 2002 to 2009 and found that although participation in urban pension insurance will increase consumption, under the condition of given insurance, the increase in contribution will reduce household consumption. The explanation given by them is : The family faces credit constraints, and there is a motive for target savings. After the pension contributions increase, people can only reduce current consumption in order to achieve savings goals.
Compared with the above-mentioned domestic and foreign research, this paper examines the impact of a new pension insurance system on household savings. The above studies used mixed cross-section data rather than panel data to control the inherent unobservable factors at the household level. The panel data we use can effectively control home fixed effects.
After the implementation of the new agricultural insurance, there are already some studies began to evaluate the effect of their policies. Shuai and Chen Zeng Yi (2013) and National Cheng Order, etc. (2013) use panel data and in 2008 CLHLS 2011/2012 two rounds, receiving influences of the new agricultural insurance pension for the elderly pension model, they found that the new agricultural insurance to reduce The dependence of older people over the age of 65 on their financial resources and care has increased the probability that the elderly will live separately from their children. However, they did not examine the impact of the new rural insurance on household savings.
In order to build a social security system covering urban and rural residents, the State Department from September 2009 issued guidelines regarding the development of new rural social pension insurance, and identified the first batch of 320 new national agricultural insurance pilot counties. Subsequently, the new rural insurance quickly advanced throughout the country. In 2010 and 2011, 518 and 1076 new national-level pilot counties were added. By the end of 2012, all the 2,853 counties (cities, districts) in the country have implemented new rural insurance, with 460 million people participating in the insurance.
The new rural insurance is covered by rural residents who have not participated in the urban employee pension insurance and are 16 years old or older. After the implementation of the new rural insurance, if you have reached the age of 60 and have not received the basic endowment insurance for urban workers, you can receive the basic pension on a monthly basis without paying the fees. If you are under 60, you will need to pay 1 year. â‘¢ insured people receive a pension from the social pool and personal accounts accounts in two parts. The funds for personal accounts come from three parts: individual contributions, government subsidies, and collective subsidies. Among them, the individual payment standard is divided into 5 grades of 1 to 500 yuan per year, and the insured person chooses the grade to pay the fee. â‘£ government subsidies for insured people pay, allowances not less than 30 yuan. Conditional village collectives will provide additional subsidies to the insured. The social pooling accounts are all from the government's financial funds, which are used to pay the insured person the full amount of the new rural insurance basic pension, the standard is not less than 55 yuan per person per month. The monthly standard for personal account pensions is the total amount of personal accounts divided by 139, so a higher amount of contributions means that you can receive a higher pension after the age of 60.
Overall, the system design of the new rural insurance system reflects the principle of “guarantee basic, broad coverage, flexibility and sustainabilityâ€. Under the consideration of increasing the participation rate as much as possible and not increasing the burden on farmers, the annual payment of new rural insurance is lower. Although it is divided into five payment grades of 100-500 yuan, most farmers actually choose 100 yuan. The amount of the payment. For residents over 60 years old, the new rural insurance provides a basic pension of 55 yuan, which guarantees the most basic pension needs.
Households affected by the new rural insurance can be divided into two categories: one is that family members are under 60 years old and need to pay for insurance; the other is that the CLHLS data they use only include 65-110-year-olds, unable to visit new farmers. The impact of insurance on people under 60 years of age.
In 2011, China began to implement urban residents' pension insurance, covering urban residents who did not participate in urban employee pension insurance. In February 2014, the Chinese government further integrated the new rural insurance with the urban residents' pension insurance, which together are called urban and rural residents' pension insurance.
If the age of collection is more than 15 years, the accumulated contribution shall be no less than 15 years. If the age is less than 15 years, the payment is allowed, and the accumulated payment is not more than 15 years.
The State Council stipulates that all localities may increase the level of payment according to actual conditions.
Members of the court are over 60 years old and do not need to pay premiums. They can receive basic pension directly. 1 The way in which new rural insurance affects these two types of households is very different. For families under the age of 60, although they are currently in the contributory stage, enrollment means that they can expect a pension wealth after the age of 60, and the risk of income after the age of 60 can also be reduced, so the new rural insurance can pass The wealth substitution effect and channels to reduce the risk of income reduce household savings. However, the amount of new rural insurance contributions is generally low, so residents expect a lower amount of pensions to be received in the future, and many residents lack reliable expectations for whether they can receive pensions that can protect their old age after the age of 60, so they are insured against The impact of savings may not be very clear. In addition, young families are largely not saving for old-age care, but for their children's education, health, housing, etc., so the introduction of new rural insurance policies may not reduce the savings of these families. For families over 60 years old, their current income immediately increases after the implementation of the new rural insurance, the recent income risk is greatly reduced, and the savings purpose of the elderly is relatively simple, mainly for the elderly. Therefore, it can be expected that the impact of the new rural insurance on the elderly may be greater.
Data and Empirical Strategies The data used in this paper is from the China Family Tracking Tuning (CFPS). The CFPS is a nationally representative large-scale micro-investment transfer implemented by the China Social Science Research Center of Peking University. The survey is designed to track the collection of individual, family and community data to reflect the Chinese society. Economic, demographic, educational, and health changes provide a data foundation for academic research and public policy analysis. The CFPS survey sample covers 14,798 households in 635 villages (communities) in 162+ counties in 25 provinces across the country. 2 The stratified multi-stage sampling design allows the sample to represent approximately 95% of the Chinese population (Xie, 2012). The CFPS national baseline survey was launched in 2010. The household survey for most households was from April to September 2010, and about 5% of the household surveys were completed by the end of 2010. In 2012, CFPS tracked the original family. Since our study is for rural families, only families with rural household registration are retained. 3 There are two types of families affected by the new rural insurance. One is that the family members are under the age of 60, and the other is the family members who are over 60 years old.
The way in which the new rural insurance affects these two types of households is very different, so we conduct an empirical study on these two types of samples. We first carried out two data processing: First, some families may have adults over the age of 60 and under 60 years old. For these families, there are two policy effects of insured and pension, in order to distinguish between the two. We have deleted these families because of the different policy effects. Secondly, if an adult in a rural family participates in the basic endowment insurance for urban workers, this will interfere with the policy effect of identifying new rural insurance policies, so we have deleted such families. 4 After the two sample definitions, the first type of family that we return to use is defined as: family members are under 60 years old (based on the age of 2012), and they do not participate in the basic pension insurance for urban workers. The second type of family definition used for regression is that family members are all over 60 years old or under 16 years old (in terms of age at 2012) and have not participated in basic endowment insurance for urban workers. 5 We have selected the balance panel data of the two types of households. For the convenience of expression, the following are referred to as “families under 60 years old†and “families over 60 years oldâ€. After data cleansing, the number of these two sample families was 3,502 and 835, respectively.
Model setting and key variables describe the use of panel data two-way fixed effect model to examine the impact of new rural insurance implementation on rural household savings rates in China. The specific model is as follows: Some regions have implemented “bundling policiesâ€, that is, only children are insured. Under the circumstances, old talents can receive basic pensions.
CFPS does not cover Tibet, Qinghai, Xinjiang, Ningxia, Inner Mongolia, Hainan, Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan.
We did not distinguish whether a family is a rural family according to the place of residence, because some rural households live in towns and cities. The new rural insurance is applicable to the rural population.
According to the policy, if a person participates in the basic endowment insurance for urban workers, he is not eligible to participate in the new rural insurance at the same time.
Family members are all over the age of 60 or under 16 years of age, which ensures that no one in the family needs to pay new farm insurance premiums, but is eligible for new farm maintenance pensions.
Among them, it represents the savings rate of the t-th year of the i-th family. WP, indicating the participation of the i-th family in the new year in the new year. In particular, the relevant control variable indicating the change of family i over time, 0; indicates the family fixed effect, and controls the intrinsic factor that the family does not change with time. Indicates the year fixed effect. Taking into account the correlation between the random disturbances of different households in the same village, we all clustered the regression criteria at the village level.
For families under the age of 60, we use two methods to measure the participation of a family in the new rural insurance premium. The first was to use 1%, and in 2012 it rose to 49.5%, indicating the rapid advancement of the new rural insurance pilot program across the country. The second is the number of people using family members to participate in the new rural insurance. In theory, the greater the number of participants, the greater the impact on household consumption and savings. It shows that 87.5% of the participants who participated in the new rural insurance payment in the sample in 2012 selected the payment amount of 100 yuan, and the number of people who chose the payment level of 500 yuan or more only accounted for 4.9%. Compared with the average household income of 37,547 yuan in the sample. The average family new rural insurance contributions (about 280 yuan) only account for the average household income. 7%, this is a very small number.
The distribution of individual new rural insurance contributions is a key explanatory variable for families over 60 years old. The distribution of pensions to household income is the distribution of the proportion of household income received by the re-farm maintenance pension. We also use the following two methods to measure the pension. The first is whether the family members receive the dummy variable of the pension. Among the 60-year-old families in the sample, the number of households receiving new pensions in 2010 accounted for 4.3%, and in 2012 it rose to 44.6%. The second is the family. The number of members who receive the pension for new farmers, the more people who receive the same pension, the greater the impact on the family. According to the sample data, 85% of the residents receive a pension level of between 55 yuan and 65 yuan per month, which shows that the proportion of new farmers' pensions for households over 60 years old accounts for household disposable income. According to calculations, this proportion averaged 22.4%, and the median reached 10.7%. The definition of household savings rate is: (family disposable income-consumption)/family disposable income. Household consumption includes food, clothing, household items, daily services, travel, communications, housing, entertainment, education, and medical care. Since education expenditure is directly related to whether the family has children in the school stage, and large medical expenses have a large suddenness, education and medical expenses have a great relationship with the age and health of family members. Very strong spending rigidity. In order to test the robustness of the results, we also calculated the second household savings rate, which is the savings rate when education and medical expenditures are not included in consumption. The two savings rates are referred to as "savings rate 1" and "savings rate 2" respectively. Since there are more extreme values ​​in the household savings rate, we have treated the extreme value of 5% in winsorize. 1 After processing, for the sample under 60 years old, the average of "saving rate 1" and "saving rate 2 (ie, the difference between saving rate 2 and saving rate 1) is 0.24, and the median is 0. 20. for 60 For the sample above the age, the mean values ​​of "saving rate 1" and "saving rate 2" are -0.39 and 0.06, respectively, and the median is 0.13 and 0.42 respectively. It can also be calculated that we also try to 2% The extreme values ​​were processed by winsorize, and the results were basically the same. The average and median of the proportion of 120% of the income of such families and medical expenses were 0.45 and 0.29 respectively. In comparison, the savings rate of the elderly is lower than 60 years old. Residents, this is consistent with the life cycle theory.
To further test the robustness of the results, we also use the logarithm of the household consumption rate, log (consumption/receipt) as an alternative explanatory variable, so as to avoid the interference of extreme values ​​on the results to a greater extent. In addition, we also directly used the logarithm of the amount of household consumption as another alternative explanatory variable and conducted a robustness test.
The control variables include the logarithm of the household disposable income, the logarithm of the average household income in the village, the number of family members, the logarithm of the family deposit balance, the proportion of children in the family (under 16 years of age), and the self-reported household Health level, whether there are family members hospitalized. The statistical characteristics of these variables are reported in Table 1.
Table 1 Descriptive statistical variable name 60 years old family 60 years old or older family observation value number mean standard deviation observation number mean standard deviation household savings rate 1 household savings rate 2 household consumption amount logarithmic household consumption rate logarithmic family The number of family members who are not eligible to participate in the new rural insurance is not applicable. The family members receive the new rural insurance. The number of family members who are not eligible for the new rural insurance is not applicable. The household income is the correct value of the per capita income of the village. The number of children in the scale of the family is the proportion of children who report the health level. Whether there are family members in the hospital. The new rural insurance is not implemented at the same time in the country, but is piloted and promoted in batches. As the new rural insurance contributions are based on the principle of voluntary participation. A large number of residents under the age of 60 did not choose to participate in the insurance. The behavior of the new rural insurance may be related to some unobservable characteristics of the family. Therefore, in the regression model (1), the key variable “whether the farmers are insured†is endogenous.
Although the control of household fixed effects can control household unobservable characteristics (such as consumption habits) that are constant over time, it is impossible to fully control the unobservable characteristics of households that change with time, and thus the coefficient estimates may still be biased. In order to solve this problem, we define the dummy variable (C/VKP, . . . ) of the new rural insurance pilot at the time of the survey according to the time when the county (district) of the family implements the new rural insurance. As a tool variable for families to participate in the new rural insurance situation. Whether each county launches a new rural insurance pilot determines whether farmers participate in the new rural insurance, and the time for a county to launch a new rural insurance pilot is mainly determined by the central government, and consumption at the household level includes household education and medical care. expenditure. From the formula point of view, lg (consumption / income) = lg (consumption rate) = lg (l - savings rate), we do not use 1 to save rate) because the savings rate may have a negative value, while the consumption rate is always positive number.
We convert the self-reported health level of the head of household into a 0-1 dummy variable. If the health level is above the median value, the dummy variable has a 嬴 value of 1. We do not control the education level of the head of the household because we are using the panel data fixed effect model. The education level of most household heads has been fixed for the past two years. We also do not control the age of the head of household, and the age of all heads of households increases by two years in both years, so this variable does not actually differ between the different observations.
The behavior is irrelevant, thus satisfying the exogenous condition of the instrumental variable. 1 In principle, in places where pilots have been carried out, elderly people over the age of 60 are eligible to receive pensions. This is not related to whether an individual chooses to participate in the insurance, so there is basically no self-selection problem. However, due to the implementation of the “bundling policy†in some areas, that is, only when the children are insured, the old talents can receive the basic pension. Therefore, strictly speaking, the variable of receiving pensions for new farmers over 60 years old is also endogenous. For this reason, we also use a county to implement the new rural insurance pilot as its instrumental variable.
IV. Impact of Participation in New Rural Insurance Payments on Household Savings For the families under 60 years of age, the results of the two-way fixed effect model of the impact of participating in the new rural insurance on the household savings rate are reported in Table 2, in which the first and third columns are explained. The variable is the savings rate of 1, and the explained variable of the fourth and sixth columns is the savings rate. 2. Table 2 The impact of the new rural insurance on the household savings rate (two-way fixed effect model) is explained by the variable savings rate 1 savings rate 2 family members participate in the new The number of family members participating in the new rural insurance system. The household income is the logarithm of the average per capita income of the village. The balance of the household deposit balance. The number of households. The proportion of the household. The health of the household. The fixed effect of the adult family. Value Note: This table is the regression result of the two-way fixed effect model of panel data. All columns control the fixed effects of the year and family. We clustered the standard clusters at the village level, with standard error / in brackets, "representing significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
In the first column, only the family members were insured and the family and the year were fixed. The coefficient of whether the family members were insured was negative, but it was not statistically significant. Column 2 is further put into other household-level control variables. The coefficient of whether the family members are insured is only 0.018, which is still statistically insignificant. The confidence interval of the coefficient estimate at 95% is (-0.051,1 of course The actual estimated coefficient of the instrumental variable is the local processing effect (LATE). It is estimated that the new rural insurance is compensating (complier, that is, the new agricultural insurance is selected after the pilot is selected 0.088), and the statistically impossible to reject the coefficient equal to zero. Assume that this indicates that participation in the new rural insurance has no significant effect on the household savings rate. Column 3 replaces the key explanatory variables with whether the family members are covered by the family members, and the coefficient estimates are small and still not significant. Columns 4-6 replace the explanatory variables with the savings rate of 2, that is, the savings rate when education and medical expenditures are not consumed. The results still show that the influence of family members participating in the new rural insurance on the savings rate is small, and Statistically not significant.
Table 3 shows the regression results after using the tool variables. Among them, the explained variables in the first and third columns are the savings rate of 1, and the explained variable in the fourth and sixth columns is the savings rate. 2. From the results of the first-stage regression, the implementation of the new rural insurance in the county is involved in the new rural insurance. The influence coefficient is significant at 1%, the F statistic for one-stage regression is much greater than 10, and the Cragg-Dnald statistic is much larger than the critical value of 16.38, so the problem of weak instrumental variables can be ruled out (Stock Yogo, 2005). The results of the two-stage regression showed that the coefficient of family participation in the new rural insurance was negative regardless of the explanatory variables and key explanatory variables, but it was still not statistically significant. Taking the regression results (column 2) after controlling other characteristics of the family as an example, the coefficient of family members participating in the new rural insurance is estimated to be -0.046, and the confidence interval at the 95% level is (-0.184, 0.093), so it is still impossible to refuse. The null hypothesis of “Participating in the new rural insurance has no effect on the household savings rateâ€. 1 As mentioned earlier, some of the existing studies have also found that pension insurance does not reduce household savings. The explanations they give include that the family does not only save for “ageingâ€, has target saving motives, has liquidity constraints, and finances. Lack of knowledge, etc. We believe that in the context of China's reality, participation in the new rural insurance contributions has no significant impact on the savings rate of residents under the age of 60. There may be the following reasons: First, and most importantly, the payment and expected benefits of the new rural insurance. The amount is very low. According to the data in the sample, the proportion of household new rural insurance contributions to the average income is only 0.7%. Zhang Huachu and Wu Jian (2013) use the actuarial method to calculate the replacement rate of Xinnong maintenance pension is only about 10%. 2 Compared with this, the urban employee pension insurance contribution accounted for 28% of the wages (including 20% ​​of the work unit payment, personal payment 8%), the minimum base of the annual payment is 2,530 yuan, the pension replacement rate exceeds 50 Therefore, compared with the urban employee pension insurance, the new rural insurance has a very limited security function, and the expected pension wealth brought by it is far from meeting the future pension needs, and it cannot reduce the residents’ age after 60 years. Expected income risk. Second, young family savings are rarely for the sake of old-age, but for the various income risks before retirement. Although China's medical security system is gradually improving, the income risks faced by the family are still large (such as unemployment). Moreover, Chinese families have a stronger target saving motive for reasons such as building houses or letting their children receive higher education. This savings opportunity is stronger when there are liquidity constraints or when it is difficult to finance externally. Therefore, the limited old-age security provided by the new rural insurance is difficult to alleviate people's motivations on these savings targets. Finally, due to the general lack of farmers' financial knowledge, and the information propaganda may not be in place, the farmers who are still in the insurance stage are not trusting the new rural insurance. They cannot accurately predict the pension wealth that can be received after the age of 60. The amount, which further restricts the role of the new rural insurance to promote consumption. According to Bai Chongen et al. (2011) based on the research of new rural cooperative medical care and Caietal. (2014) based on the ability of sows insurance, due to the low level of education of rural residents in China, the insured has insufficient understanding and trust in insurance programs. The lack of will greatly limit the role of a new social insurance program.
As far as the control variables are concerned, household income has a significant positive impact on the savings rate, which is consistent with the law of diminishing marginal propensity to consume. The average income of the village has a negative impact on the household savings rate, but it is not significant, indicating that it only partially supports the relative income hypothesis of consumption. In the case of controlling absolute income, the higher the average income of the village, the lower the relative income of the family in the village, the lower the income of the family and the other neighbors, so even if they Income remains the same, and the average income of neighbors will increase their consumption (Duesenberry, 1949). The size of the family population has a significant negative relationship with the household savings rate, while the proportion of children in the family has a positive relationship with the household savings rate, but it is not significant. The poorer the health of the head of household, the lower the savings rate, and may require higher medical expenses due to poor health. Finally, the presence of adults in the home will significantly reduce the household savings rate by 14 percentage points.
We also conducted the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test. From the test results, we cannot reject the exogenous nature of the key explanatory variable “family members participating in the new rural insuranceâ€.
The pension replacement rate is the ratio between the level of pensions received by workers when they retire and the level of pre-retirement wages.
Table 3 The impact of new rural insurance on household savings rate (two-way fixed effect model, using instrumental variables) PanelA: two-stage regression results are explained variables variable savings rate 1 savings rate 2 family members participate in the new rural insurance to participate in the new rural insurance family members The household income is the logarithm of the average per capita income of the village. The balance of the household deposit is the value of the household size. The proportion of the household is the health level of the household.
The fixed effect of the year is the number of observations p value PanelB: “stage regression results county implemented the new rural insurance F statistics Note: This table is the result of the panel data bidirectional fixed effect model after using the tool variable, all columns control the year and The fixed effect of the family, the standard error in parentheses, represents significant at the 1%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
(2) Using the household consumption rate and consumption amount as the explanatory variables The regression result above uses the savings rate as the explanatory variable. In order to test the robustness of the results, we also examined the impact of participating in the new rural insurance on household consumption. We use the logarithm of the consumption rate and the amount of consumption as the explanatory variables, and the control variables are still compared with the publicly explained variables. The household consumption rate is the value of the household consumption. The value of the family members participates in the new rural insurance to participate in the new rural insurance. The number of other control variables is the family fixed effect is the year fixed effect is the number of observations Note: This table is the result of the two-way fixed-effect model regression of the panel data after using the instrumental variables. All the columns control the household income logarithm and the per capita income of the village. The logarithm, the log balance of family deposits, the size of the family, the proportion of children, the self-reported health of the head of household, whether the family has adult hospitalization, and the fixed effect of the year and family. Due to space limitations, we have not reported the coefficients of these control variables. . The standard errors in parentheses represent the effects of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 5. The effect of receiving new farm maintenance pensions on household savings shows that for residents under 60 years old, participation in new rural insurance contributions is Household savings did not have a significant impact.
For residents over the age of 60, they do not need to pay their own fees to receive pensions of not less than 660 yuan per year. We expect their savings behavior to be more affected by the new rural insurance. For residents over 60 years old, the regression results of pensions for household savings are reported in Table 5. The explained variables in column 1 and 2 are the savings rate. 1. The regression coefficient in column 1 indicates that the new farmers are receiving maintenance. The household savings rate of gold will be reduced by 25.1 percentage points, and the confidence interval of the coefficient at 95% is (-0.504, 0.002). In the second column, the coefficient of “the number of family members receiving pensions for new farmers†is also significantly negative. The number of people receiving pensions in the family increases by one person, and the savings rate will decrease by 14.7 percentage points. Column 3 replaces the explanatory variable with the savings rate of 2 (not for education and medical expenditures), and the coefficient for receiving new rural insurance is still significantly negative, and the new rural insurance has reduced the savings rate by 17.9 percentage points. The magnitude is less than the impact of the new rural insurance on the savings rate. Since the difference between savings rate 1 and savings rate 2 is education and medical expenditure, this shows that despite the greater rigidity of education and medical expenditures, receiving pensions for new farmers still accounts for the proportion of education and medical consumption to income. Increased by 7.2 percentage points. In the fourth column coefficient, the explanatory variable “the number of family members receiving the new farm maintenance pension†is still significantly negative, but the coefficient is also smaller than in the second column.
As mentioned earlier, there is an endogenous problem with whether a family member over 60 years old receives a pension. To this end, we still use “a county has implemented a new rural insurance pilot†as a tool variable, and the second-stage regression results are reported in columns 5-8. From the results of the 5-8 column, it can be seen that when the savings rate 1 or the savings rate 2 is used as the explanatory variable, the coefficient of the key explanatory variable is still negative, and the coefficient is larger than when the 1 to 2 column is not applicable to the instrumental variable. 1 Except for the 8th column with a significance of only 15%, the rest are all. However, the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test P value indicates that we cannot refuse family members to receive new farm insurance as exogenous.
Significant at the 5% or 10% level. Taking the 5th and 7th columns as an example, when family members receive new farm insurance, the household savings rate will be reduced by 64.8 percentage points, and the household savings rate will be reduced by 34.9 percentage points. This also means that the new rural insurance has increased the proportion of education and medical consumption expenditures to income by 29.9 percentage points. The coefficient symbols and saliency of other control variables are substantially similar to Table 4.
The higher the household income and the higher the proportion of children, the lower the savings rate; the larger the family size and the hospitalization of family members will reduce the savings rate.
Table 5 The effect of pension on savings rate Two-way fixed effect Two-way fixed effect + Instrumental variable Interpreted variable Savings rate 1 Savings rate 2 Savings rate 1 Savings rate 2 Family members receiving new rural insurance The number of family members receiving new rural insurance Family income The logarithmic value of the average per capita income of the villages. The balance of the household household balance. The proportion of the household size. The health of the household. The health effect of the household. The fixed effect of the year is the fixed value of the year. The number of observations is p value. Note: All the columns in this table are listed. Controls the fixed effects of the year and family. The standard errors in the brackets are "," which are significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Table 6: The impact of pensions on consumption (two-way fixed effect model) Explanated variable household consumption rate on the value of household consumption, the number of family members receiving new rural insurance, the number of family members receiving new rural insurance, other control variables is the family fixed effect is年份固定效应是观测值数观测指数注：本表是使用é¢æ¿æ•°æ®åŒå‘固定效应模型回归结果，所有列å‡æŽ§åˆ¶äº†å®¶åºæ”¶äººå¯¹æ•°å€¼ã€æ‘庄人å‡æ”¶äººå‡å€¼çš„对数值ã€å®¶åºå˜æ¬¾ä½™é¢å¯¹æ•°å€¼ã€å®¶åºè§„模ã€å°‘儿所å 比é‡ã€æˆ·ä¸»è‡ªæŠ¥å¥åº·æ°´å¹³ã€å®¶åºæ˜¯å¦æœ‰æˆå¹´äººä½é™¢ä»¥åŠå¹´ä»½å’Œå®¶åºçš„固定效应，由于篇幅é™åˆ¶ï¼Œæˆ‘们没有报告这些控制å˜é‡çš„系数。括å·å†…æ ‡å‡†è¯¯/ã€"ã€åˆ†åˆ«ä»£è¡¨åœ¨10%ã€5%å’Œ1%水平下显著。
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